Prof. Gholamreza Aavani
Head of Iranian Institute of Philosophy
Shamsuddin Muhammad Shahrzuri is one of the distinguished
philosopher-sages of the seventh century. He is the first
commentator and expositor of Suhrawardi’s Hikmat-al-Ishraq1,
which was much utilized by later commentators. He is also the
writer of a famous history of philosophy entitled as Nuzhat-alarwāh
wa rawdat-al-afrah or simply known as Tarikh al-
Hukama2, in which Shahrzuri tries to compile a universal history of
philosophy on the basis of the principles of philosophical
historiography as delineated by Suhrawardi in his works especially
in Hikmat-al-Ishraq. He is moreover the writer of the monumental
work ash- Shajarat-al-Ilahiyyah3 (The Divine Tree) which is a
veritable compendium of Islamic philosophy in about two
thousand pages written in the illuminationist vein. He might be the
author of other works such as the extremely profound and terse
treatise by an unidentified author published by Abdurrahman
Badawi under the forged title ” al-muthul al-aqliyyah alaflatuniyyah”,
which according to Badawi was written by an
author who antedated Qutbuddin Shirazi (d.710). In the eighth
chapter of the fourth treatise of the Shajarah Shahrzuri proclaims
his intention to write a treatise on his topic. The following is a
brief survey of Shahrzuri’s ethical theory as set fourth in the
Shajarah.
******
The treatise of Shahrzuri on ethics4 starts with the much-debated
problem of the relationship between the theoretical and practical
philosophy and as to which one is prior. Almost all the peripatetics
believe in the priority of the theoretical over the practical
philosophy. Avicenna for example in the illāhiyyat of his magnum
opus Shifā5 categorically asserts the priority of the former over the
latter. He even goes so far as to maintain that even in practical
philosophy the theoretical ingredient takes precedence over the
practical element, because no praxis is possible without the
theoria.
Shahrzuri, on the contrary upholds the theory that “the practical
philosophy is prior to the theoretical, because the perception of the
intelligible realities as it should, depends upon the purity of the
soul and its being illuminated and both depend on the purification
of the soul and the perfecting of the political virtues”6.
Shahrzuri quotes a passage from Farabi to the effect that the
initiate in philosophy should be well-versed in all good traits. He
should know well the Quran and the sciences of the Shariah; he
must be chaste, veracious and must shun and abhor all vices such
as wickedness, debauchery, treachery, perfidiousness, cunning and
double-dealing. He should moreover devote himself to the
performance of religious obligations (adā’ al-wazāif al-Shariyyah),
without transgressing any pillar of Shariah 7″ all this should be
construed to signify the priority of the practical philosophy which
is nothing other than the purification of the soul over the
theoretical.
Again he quotes Farabi as saying that ” The consummation of
happiness is through moral virtues as the fruit is the consummation
of the tree”8. This divergence of opinion from the peripatetics
arises no doubt from the illuminationist’s emphasis upon the
purifications, expurgation and rectification of the soul as a
necessary step prior to the attainment of sapiential wisdom.
Definition of Khulq (a moral trait)
Shahzuri defines Khulq in a peripatetic vein as “an innate
disposition (malakah) whence issue all the acts with facility (bisuhūlah)
without any thought (fikr) or deliberation (rawiyyah)”9.
Now the problem immediately arises as to whether such moral
traits are changeable or not. There are some who argue that moral
traits, being based on physical temperament, are fixed and
unalterable. People of hot temperament (hārr al-mazāj) for
example tend to becourageous, as those of cold temperament tend
to be cowardly (jabān). Such is the case with other moral traits10.
Shahzuri does not accept this view. The upshot of his refutation
rests on his claim that moral behavior is impossible without
rational choice. “It is possible to change and alter our moral traits.
They are liable to increase, decrease, to excess and emendation,
through abundant practice of words, deeds, motions, rests and
concepts (tasawurat). Otherwise prophets, sages and saints would
not take upon themselves the trouble of calling people to God in
every possible way. They would not command people to attain the
moral virtues. Moreover how would such an absurdity be
reconciled with what has been reported from the foremost among
the human beings (upon whom be the benedictions of God) that “I
was chosen in order to bring to completion the noble virtues”. It is
possible for a reasonable being to come to know that through
contemplation and experience”11.
The types of virtues
Greek ethical theory had much impact upon the formulation of a
rationally justified ethical theory in Islam, especially among
Muslim philosophers who seldom thought about founding the
metaphysical foundations for an ethical theory based on the tenets
of the Quran12. The codification and classification of virtues
among Muslim philosophers is an Islamic version of the ethical
code as propounded by Plato and Aristotle and occasionally by the
Stoics. Plato’s division and classification of the virtues rests on the
tripartite division of the soul in the Republic. The soul, according
to Plato has three main functions each proper to a specific faculty,
to which belongs a specific virtue, being the perfection and
consummation of that faculty13. “In Aristotle, the spheres of the
several virtues are strictly narrowed down and we are enabled all
the better to estimate the widening and spiritualizing of moral
ideals which the centuries since Aristotle have brought with
them14″. Crucial to Aristotle’s ethical theory is the doctrine of the
“golden mean” according to which each virtue is a mean or an
intermediary between two extremes of deficiency and excess. This
theory was taken over by the Muslim Philosophers and employed
in their elaboration and justification of a sort of an Islamic virtueethics.
Shahzuri, in his classification of the virtues combines the four
cardinal virtues of the Republic based on the tripartite faculties of
the soul with the peculiarly Aristotelian version of theory of the
“golden mean”. The human soul, according to him, has three main
faculties, the rational (al-nātiqah) also called the intellectual (al-
‘aqliyyah); the appetitive (al-shahawanniyah) and the irascible (alghadabiyyah).
As to the intellectual faculty, it is the angelic soul
( an-nafs al-malikiyyah) in man, being the principle of discernment
between truth and error, of meditation and ratiocination (fikr) and
the intrinsic desire to comprehend the eternal verities. The
refinement (Tahdhib) of the theoretical faculty (al-quwwah-alnazariyyah)
is called “theoretical philosophy” (al-hikmah alnazariyyah)
15.
As to the appetitive soul, which is also called the animal soul; it is
the driving force for concupiscence (shahwah) and for search after
food and for seeking enjoyment through food, drink and sexual
intercourse16.
As to the irascible faculty, it is that bestial soul in man which
provokes anger and makes one audacious in horrible situations
(ahwal) and has an intrinsic desire for domination, haughtiness,
arrogance and glory. As in Plato, the harmonization between these
three faculties through the wise administration of reason
constitutes the paramount virtue of justice (idalah) in the absence
of which each faculty inclines and deviates into the two extremes
of excess (ifrat) or deficiency (tafrit). The excess in the theoretical
faculty is called stupidity (safah) or undaunted silliness (jarbazah);
that in the appetitive faculty is named covetousness (sharah) and
the extravagance in the irascible faculty “rashness” (tahawwur).
On the other hand the deficiency in the rational faculty is simplemindedness
(balah); that in the appetitive, impotency (khumūd)
and the extravagance in the irascible faculty cowardice (jubn). “but
when the three faculties are in equilibrium (‘itidāl) there springs
forth a third virtue which is justice arising from the refinement of
the practical faculty, whose two extremes are injustice (zulm) and
receptivity to injustice (inzilām)17.
The list of four cardinal virtues in al-shajarah corresponds to the
four virtues in Plato and Aristotle and the four cardinal virtues
recognized by Greek sages in general, that is justice (dikē),
wisdom (Sophia, phronesis), courage (andreia) and temperance
(sophrosynē) “. The refinement of the appetitive is called selfcontrol
(or temperance ‘iffah) and of the irascible faculty,
courage … so the corresponding virtues are wisdom, temperance,
courage and justice. Each virtue is a mean; but the extremes are
without limit. Every virtue or moral excellence is a mean bounded
by two vices, I mean the two extremes of excess and deficiency.
The mean is the straight path; so a man of moral excellence should
not transgress it, because according to the measure of his
transgression, he would deviate, stray and swerve from the
otherworldly happiness. That is a very painful disease from which
very few can eschew except those unique individuals among the
most virtuous and the most perfect (al-amthal)”18.
In corroboration of the point at issue, Shahzuri refers to the words
of prophets and sages to the effect that there are very few who are
on the straight path and the rest, would be rent to pieces and would
be scattered in indefinite barāzikh after the demolition of their
bodies, where they would stay awhile, ascending from stage to
stage, until finally they cast aside all those configurations (hay’āt).
Shahzuri then goes on to enumerate all the subsidiary virtues
subsumed under each of the four cardinal virtues.19
The virtues subsumed under wisdom (al-hikmah)
There are six virtues subsumed under hikmah, first mental acumen
or intelligence (dhakā) which consists of promptness in deriving
conclusions from the premises and the facility in deduction due to
persistent practice until it becomes a stable disposition (malakah);
second ready comprehension (sur’ah al-fahm), that is the motion of
the soul from the concomitants (malzumat) of things to their
essential qualities (lawāzim); third the purity of mind (safā aldhihn),
that is the aptitude of the soul to make present its desired
end without agitation; fourth, the ease of learning (suhulah alta’allum);
that is the agility of the soul in acquiring its desired end,
without the hindrance of confused thoughts, so that the soul in its
entirety pays heed to its object of desire; fifth, retentiveness
(tahafuzz) by which the forms apprehended by reason (‘aql),
estimative faculty (wahm) or imagination (takhayyul) are called
forth with the least effort; sixth “recollection” (tadhakkur) by
which the soul is able to contemplate the forms stored up in the
retentive faculty whenever it wishes with a sort of facility due to its
acquired disposition20.
The virtues subsumed under courage
Eleven virtues are subsumed under courage which are: first greatsouledness
(kibar an-nafs) which is indifference to both esteem and
contempt; second intrepidity (najdah) which is the self-assurance
of man in times of horror and consternation when anxiety causes
disorderly motions; third magnanimity (uluww un-nafs), by which
the soul is neither elated nor depressed by worldly gains; fourth
stability (thabāt-al-himmah), which is a power in the soul by which
it endures pains and withstands calamities; fifth “forbearance”
(hilm), that is the abstention of the soul from any kind of anger,
with ease and facility; sixth serenity (sukūn) by which the soul
lives up to the injunctions of the shari’ah and the divine intellect in
altercations and hostilities (khusūmāt); seventh astuteness
(shahāmah) which is a power in the soul which enables it to
acquire great things in expectation of the good repute; eighth
endurance (tahammul) which is the ability of the soul to exploit the
proper tools and gadgets in order to achieve the praiseworthy ends;
ninth humility (tawādu’) which consists in that you do not esteem
for yourself any advantage over those lower than you in rank; tenth
ardent zeal (hamiyyah) which means that one should guard what
ought to be guarded without any lassitude (tahawun); eleventh
“compassion” (riqqah); by which the soul suffers from the pains
and ailments of the humankind21.
The virtues subsumed under self-restraint or temperance
(iffah)
There are twelve virtues comprised under the cardinal virtue of
temperance: first modesty (hayā) which is a sort of alteration
accruing to the human soul when getting aware of perpetrating evil
acts in order to avoid blameworthiness; second leniency (rifq)
which consists in the voluntary submission of the soul to the
happenings and events; third “right guidance” (husn al-huda)
which is a true yearning of the soul to perfect itself; fourth
reconciliation (musalamah) which consists in that the soul should
display civility and amiability in disputes without being perturbed
(bilā Idtirab); fifth equanimity (da’ah) which is the composure of
the soul when concupiscence is excited; sixth patience (sabr)
which is the steadfastness of the soul against delightful but wicked
pleasures lest they should issue forth; seventh frugality (qina’ah)
which is the satisfaction of the soul with the necessities of life;
eight “gravity” (waqar) which is the imperturbability of the soul
when attending to its object of desire; ninth “piousness” (wara’)
which is the adherence of the soul to good deeds and praiseworthy
actions; tenth “orderliness” (intizam) which is a sort of assessment
(taqdir) and arrangement (tartib) by the soul as required and
moreover to take into consideration the common interests until this
becomes a fixed disposition in the soul; eleventh “liberty”
(hurriyyah) which is the disposition of the soul to acquire property
through lawful channels and to dispose it in rightful ways; twelfth
munificence (sakhā) which is the bestowal of one’s property in the
easiest manner. In shahrazuri’s view munificence itself branches
off into eight subsidiary virtues as follows: charity (karam),
forgiveness (‘afw), manliness (muru’ah), nobility of character
(nubl), equity (muwāsāt); toleration (musāmahah) and altruism
(īthār), that is preferring others to oneself.22
Virtues subsumed under justice comprising twelve
virtues:
first « friendship » (sadāqah) which is a sort of veritable love
which stimulates one to make preparations for things which cause
the well-being and prosperity of friends; second intimacy (ulfah)
which is the unanimity of a certain group working in mutual
collaboration in order to gain a better livelihood ; third “fidelity”
(wafā) which is attachment to the way of equity and mutual
collaboration, without ever transgressing it; fourth “compassion”
(shafaqah) which is the disposition of the soul to eradicate the
causes of pain while witnessing them in other human beings; fifth
“visiting the relatives” (silah al-rahim) which means to make your
relatives and kinsmen your partners in worldly goods; sixth “good
recompense” (mukāfāt) which is to compensate good deeds done to
you, with at least as many good deeds or more; seventh “good
partnership” (husn al-shirkah), that is the give-and-take in your
transactions should be in a state of equilibrium; eighth good
judgment (husn al-qada); that is to fulfill the obligations due to
others without obligating them and without feeling regret; ninth
“affection” (tawaddud) that is seeking the affection of peers (akfā’)
and people of merit with good words and broad insight; tenth
“submission” which means that one should not object to the deeds
issuing from God the Almighty; eleventh “trust in God” (tawakkul)
which consists in that one should not see human beings as true
agents in acts depending on human power and one should not wish
therein, any augmentation, diminution, precipitation nor delay;
twelfth “worship” (‘ibādah) which consists in that the creator
should be exalted in the souls and glorified in the hearts; so should
be those proximate to the Divine threshold like angels, prophets
and saints (peace of God upon all).23
The types of vices
According to Shahzuri, each virtue is a mean between two vices,
which are two extremes of excess and deficiency standing in two
opposite directions. We try to abbreviate in a tabular form the list
of vices, with respect to their associated virtues24.
excess mean deficiency
overwittiness
(khubs)
wittiness
(dhuka)
dull- wittedness
(baladah)
quick imagination;
sudden but flimsy
flashes of imagination
quick understanding
(sur’ah al-fahm)
tardiness in
comprehension
(ibtā’ fi-l-fahm)
darkness
(zulmah)
accruing the soul
purity of mind
(safā-adh-dhihn)
Tardiness
(ta’khir)
in deducing conclusions
hastening of the soul in
ascertaining forms
(istithbat al-suwar)
ease of learning
(suhūlah at-ta’allum)
difficulty
(su’ūbah)
in learning
excessive waste of time
in futile musings
good intellection
(husn at-ta’āqqul)
Failure of the mind
(qusur al-fikr)
in intelligizing the
desired ends
wasteful expenditure of
time in retaining futile
things
retentiveness
(hifz)
negligence (ghaflah) in
verifying grave and
momentous things
examination of
unnecessary things
which cause waste of
time (tadyy’ al-waqt)
and blunt the faculty
recollection
(tadhakkur)
forgetfulness
(nisyān) of things which
ought to be memorized
bashfulness
(khurq)
modesty
(hayā)
shamelessness
prodigality
(isrāf)
munificence
(sakha)
Niggardliness,
close-fistedness
(bukhl)
arrogance
(takabbur)
humility
(tawad’u)
self-abasement
(tadhallul)
depravity
(fisq)
worship
(‘ibādah)
straitening self-restraint
(taharruj)
casuistry
Most people mistake the extremity of excess-which is a vice- for
the mean, which is a virtue, which might be explained as being due
to short-sightedness. For example most people erroneously take
rashness for courage and prodigality for munificence. But such
error does not occur on the part of deficiency, because deficiency
is a sort of privation and so few would misconstrue cowardice or
niggardliness for courage and munificence. In certain other virtues
such as humility and forbearance, the reverse is the case, that is the
virtue in question is identified with deficiency, which according to
Shahrzuri, is due to the fact that such virtues are more privative
(‘adami) in nature.25
Footnotes
1- See Hossein Ziaee’s edition of Sharh Hikmat-al Ishraq of
Shahrzuri, published by Pazhooheshgah-i-ulūm-i-insani,
Tehran, 1372 (solar)
2- The original Arabic version was poblished by Matba’ah
uthmaniyyah,in Heydarabad, India. The old Persian
translation of the book by Maqsood Ali Tabrizi was edited
and published by Muhammad Taqi Daneshpazhooh and
Muhammad Sarwar Maulā’ī (Ilmi-wa farhangi press, Tehran,
1356) A later Persian translation by the late Zia’ad-Din Durri
titled Kanz-al Hikmah has been published several times.
3- al- Shajarat-al-Ilahiyyah fi ulūm al-Haqai’q al-rabbaniyyah,
is being edited by distinguished Iranian scholar Najafquli
Habibi, the first part having been publishedrecently:
(published by the Iranian Institute of Philosophy,
Tehran,2005)
4- Shahrzuri, al- Shajarah PP.473-488.
5- See the introduction of Ibnsina to the Ilahiyyat edited by
Anwati and reprinted by the Ayyatollah Mar’ashi Najafi
Library, Qum, 1404 A.H. (lunar)
6- Shahrzuri, op.cit. P.376
7- Ibid
8- Ibid, P.377
9- Ibid, P.378
10- Ibid
11- Ibid, P.379
12- This is not to downgrade or depreciate the tremendous and
laborious efforts by the Muslims to reconcile the wisdomtradition
of all peoples with the tenets of the holy Shariah.
No doubt, this wisdom- tradition enabled the Muslim to
better understand the tenets and the tenor of the faith. What I
mean is that there was also the possibility of laying the
foundations of an ethical theori on the basis of the teachings
of the revelation and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. This
was done of course to a large extent, but now is the time to
be systematized.
13- For a good and elaborate discussion about the different
ethical theories and their philosophical presuppositions see
for example: Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, E.J.
Brill, Leiden,1991.
14- Sir David Ross, Aristotle, University Paperbacks, London,
1966. P.201
15- Shahrzuri, op.cit. P.479
16- ibid
17- ibid PP. 479-80
18- idem
19- idem
20- ibid P.481
21- ibid P.482
22- ibid PP.483-5
23- ibid PP.485-7
24- ibid P.487
25- ibid P.488

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