Iran’s ideologists are searching for a position of power within the diversity of Islamic countries.
They once stood up in order to ignite a world revolution and spread the Shiite Caliphate throughout the globe. Iran’s revolution in 1979 was targeted against the Shah’s reign and was initially supported by a multitude of diverse groups that consisted of religious-political, liberal, left- and right-wing members as well as civil groups. At the end, religious-political hardliners backed up Ajatollah Khomeini[1] and declared the Islamic Republic. Political opponents were executed or “spinned” in several waves of severe and violent prosecutions, that occurred both in Iran and abroad[2]. The continuation of the revolution was adapted in the constitution[3].
The goal to export the ideology of the Supreme Leader[4] to other countries continues to be minutely calculated and pursued in Iran today. Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq are countries, where Iran’s influence has become visible. Quite a few African and South American countries are under the clear influence of Iran, which becomes particularly apparent in the area of ideological teachings, as well as the weapon and oil trade. Members of military trained personell of the Quds-army, who were created as the foreign department of the Pasdaran[5], are particularly involved in this process.
In Europe, well-trained Iranian agents are trying to gently win the hearts and minds of academics. Iran defines this battle as a struggle against the cultural-NATO[6].
While in Iran Sufi-dervishes[7] are not being spared from harassment and are at times even deprived of their basic rights, Iranian agents are using the sweet words of the famous Sufi poets Hafis, Sa’adi or Rumi to woe the hearts and minds of German, English, and French scholars. Often, young academics and students are invited on study trips to Iran, sponsored by the regime in Iran. The purpose of these trips is to highlight the beauty of Iran without ever exposing the academics and students to the country’s grim and brutal realities.
“An attack is only as good, as the defense permits it to be” – might be the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini’s follower, the elderly Ali Khamenei[8]. Ali Khamenei is concerned about his weakly legitimized position of power and his ability to maintain the status quo in his country. Every protest and every memorial event that is not being organized by Khamenei’s henchmen, poses a potential political risk to the regime. As a result, the regime responds with violent attacks. Two of the most successfully organized protests[9] ended with bloodshed, followed by the tightening of censorship measures.
As the quickly and perhaps to hastily labelled “Arab spring” protests swept through the North African countries, it was Khamenei, who quickly facilitated protests that seemingly seemed to support his ideology. He referred to these protests as the “Islamic Awakening”, highlighting their conformity to the “Islamic Revolution” in Iran. The rivalry between Sunni leaders in Saudi Arabia, Quatar and other countries and the Shiite leaders of Iran, who are trying to include Sunnis in the world revolution, became particularly apparent during this time.
At the end, a war in Syria developed representing a war between these powers: those from Iran, who fight for Assad and those, who were trying to act independently and those who received their main support from Arab-Sunni dominated countries. Even Turkey supported all possible groups in their fight against the Assad regime, thereby opposing Iran.
One of the results of this rivalry is the stepping forth of the Dâesch group, also referred to as “IS”, who mercilessly asserts itself in Iraq and Syria, with the support of several obscure sources. The Iranian backed up Shiite Militia[10] in Iraq is trying to go against the Dâesch and delivers similarly brutal results.
The strong resistance[11] against the influence of the Shiite regime in areas outside of Iran and the efficient sanctions against Iran, force the Supreme Leader Khamenei to think of alternative ways of proceeding. At the same time, there are rumours that Khamenei is terminally ill, causing deliberations about his successor[12]. And there is tension in the country. Every now and then, people dare to gather out on the streets. Sufi-Dervishes are protesting in front of the Evin prison[13] or the office of the district attorney in solidarity with members of their religious community, who are being unlawfully held in prison. In addition, protest against executions and acid attacks are taking place and workers and teachers are complaining about not being paid their monthly salary, among other things throughout the country.
The fear of public protests
It is becoming increasingly complicated for Iran to attain a leading position within the range of Islam-oriented countries. The political fox Akbar Rafsandjani has been advising Khamenei for some time now, to divert from his position as a revolutionary and instead install a moderate Islamic state in order to reach out to the Iranian people and prevent any protests against the regime. As a result, ideologists of the Islamic-political world revolution like Said Ghassemi and Hassan Abbasi[14] are alarmed, because it would mark the end of their political stardom. They gave vows to their leader to be faithful and propagated an ideology of sacrifice for him and the revolution. Repeatedly, they have put together lists of voluntary suicide bombers and pressured their Leader to not give in to the demands of the West. The hardliners were thus disappointed when Khamenei confirmed in an interview, that he was backing up the nuclear negotiations with the USA.
Time will show, if there will be any substantial changes in Iran. The regime has to fight on many fronts while needing to stay focused on their goal. Although no revolutionaries have fallen down yet, they are tumbling.
In the middle of November 2014 Ezzatollah Zarghami, after being the head of the Iranian governmental television (IRIB) for ten years, was replaced by his deputy chairman Mohammad Sarafraz. Sarafraz is considered to be the founder of the English-speaking Press TV, the Arab-speaking al-Alam and the Spanish-speaking Hispan TV. These TV channels are considered to be very prestigious projects and are aimed at representing the official work of the regime abroad. A budget of several billion US $ has been provided to the creators.
The governmental TV is not particularly popular among the Iranian people. In fact, people rather run the risk of being caught watching censored television than to host Iranian state propaganda in their living rooms. According to some estimates, seventy percent of the population in Tehran watches foreign channels through satellite dishes. Although Iranian police forces constantly remove the dishes, the people of Iran continue to be inventive and find ways to rise up against the imposed prohibitions.
In light of these recent events, the change in leadership of the Iranian television can be understood as an attempt, to make Iranian television more attractive to its people. At the very least, it is an attempt to have the Iranian people support their state and stabilize the tumbling revolutionaries in their fight for the credibility and worth of a political Islam and prevent them from falling down at the end.
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[1] www.bpb.de/internationales/asien/iran/40110/das-politische-system
[2] z.B. das http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/20-jahre-danach-erinnerungen-an-das–mykonos-attentat-,10809148,17254288.html” target=”_blank”>Attentat vom 17. September 1992 im Restaurant Mykonos in Berlin. Details zu dem Anschlag.
[3] www.eslam.de/manuskripte/verfassung_iri/praeambel%20.htm Unterpunkt Staatlichkeit im Islam
[4] Der Oberste Führer ist sowohl militärisches, staatliches und religiöses Oberhaupt und soll direkt von Gott seine Befehle erhalten. Alle Untertanen sind zu Gehorsam verpflichtet, ansonsten werden sie als Häretiker und Verräter betrachtet.
[5] Pasdaran sind die sogenannten Revolutionsgarden, die dem Obersten Führer direkt unterstellt sind und als Hüter der Revolution nach Innen wirken. Die Quds-Armee (Jerusalem-Armee) widmet sich dem Export der Revolution.
[7] www.heise.de/tp/artikel/22/22413/1.html
[8] en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Khamenei – mehriran.de/fileadmin/Downloads/Ali_Chamene_i.pdf
[9] Die Kettenmorde in den 90er Jahren und die Niederschlagung der Studentenproteste durch Ketten und Messer schwingende paramilitärische Bassidschi Einheiten auf Motorrädern und die Proteste von 2009 nach der fingierten Wiederwahl von Präsident Ahmadinedschad.
[10] www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-06/irak-iran-revolutionsgarden-quds-brigaden
[11] Zum Beispiel wurde Ministerpräsident Nouri al-Maliki gegen den Willen Irans von Haider al-Abadi ersetzt, der sich Irans Drängen widersetzt das von den iranischen Volksmujahedin bewohnte Camp Ashraf aufzulösen.
[12] www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/iran-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-succession-supreme-leader
[13] observers.france24.com/content/20140924-police-iranian-sufi-protest-dervishes – hriran.com/en/test/42-dervishsufi/5107-gonabadi-dervishes-and-civil-disobedience.html – https://de->
[14] mehriran.de/artikel/kaderschmiede-der-diktatur.html
Published on mehriran.de/en – written by Helmut N. Gabel