This is part of an analytical article about Political Islam in today Algeria which you can read the whole article here. The selected part focuses on the role of Sufis in the political status of Algeria.

Sufi brotherhoods have come to have a larger political function in Algeria despite their outwardly apolitical character. Many play important roles in how the state attempts to manage political Islam and to maintain a monopoly over religious symbolism and power. This has not always been the case. In the past, traditional Sufi brotherhoods have been besieged, seen, especially during the Boumediène era, as threats to state consolidation, state Islam, the societal fabric, and modernizing policies. The shift from their violent repression to their cooptation and utilization occurred under President Bouteflika for several reasons.

First, many contemporary approaches in Algeria and elsewhere to countering Islamist extremism have cast Sufi brotherhoods as home-grown bulwarks whose meditation and mysticism can provide a “moderate” counterbalance to “imported” extremist ideology. In Algeria, this strategy was originally driven chiefly by domestic interests. Now, as international counterterrorism cooperation has become the key axis for Algerian engagement with the U.S. and EU, Sufi mysticism has increasingly been promoted as the panacea against extremist ideologies. Through this, the Algerian government has tried to position itself vis-à-vis its western allies as uniquely suited to handle the ideological drivers of terror and as a voice of moderate Islam. Of course, these dynamics are not unique to Algeria; Morocco and Tunisia, among many others, have also pursued similar Sufi promotion policies in tandem.50

As a result, state authorities have increasingly taken on Sufis as a loyal ally against political Islam and ‘foreign’ Wahhabi ideology.51 Through this, Sufi networks have helped to expand state influence and reach. Especially in the rural areas where Sufi zaouïas52 still have some informal clout, they help legitimize state policies, mobilize voters, and in some cases even serve as channels for government services. As such, Sufi networks aid in boosting the legitimacy of the incumbent: ahead of elections, Bouteflika53 has embarked on nationwide zaouïa-tours, getting blessings from sheikhs, paying respects at mausoleums, and making monetary donations (state largesse) with the expectation of political support. This strategy has been useful for the state not only in the countryside, but also more broadly where the optics of piety are of growing importance.

Moreover, where the Algerian government has wished to expand its regional power and influence, it has used Sufi history and networks to highlight its historic religious links to the Sahel countries in its neighborhood. For example, the League of Sahel Ulemas, created in 2013, emphasizes its Sufi history, especially the role of the Tidjaniya Order,54 as a regionally binding force.

Therefore, while the Sufis are not “partisan,” they have come to play more overtly political roles than the Salafists and are more actively leveraged by the state toward political ends. State patronage has even incentivized inter-zaouïa competition and rent-seeking behavior. Unlike the Salafist arena however, many youth disapprove of the political nature of Sufi promotion, while many others see Sufism as bida’ and not within the parameters of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).55

source: http://www.eurasiareview.com/14102017-political-islam-in-post-conflict-algeria-analysis/