In Exclusive Interview With Rooz
By Sara Samavati
As the November 24th deadline for nuclear talks between Iran and the so called P5+1 major powers draws near, Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani’s latest remarks speak of optimism if the West reduces its demands while the British foreign minister Philip Hammond is not “optimistic” about the talks and believes they the talks will be extended.
In Iran, as elsewhere, commentary and speculation on this abounds. Tehran University pro-reform professor of political science Sadegh Zibakalam is among those in Iran who is optimistic about the talks. Here are the excerpts of an exclusive interview Rooz had with him.
Rooz: What do you think will be the results of the last round of talks?
Zibakalam: I am very optimistic and believe that an agreement will be reached. It is possible that this agreement may not be a comprehensive one but another interim one which would indicate that the talks have not failed. Talks would continue at the experts level.
My optimism stems from the fact that contrary to the principlist administration (of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), Rouhani’s administration has not desired to use the nuclear issue for political propaganda purposes. Dur9ing its 8 years in office, parts of the Ahmadinejad administration unfortunately had a political perspective of the issue and wanted to use it for domestic and international political purposes. They wanted to use the crisis to expand the animosity with the West.
Rooz: In his last days in office, Mr. Ahmadinejad had said that he had no role in the nuclear issue. Don’t you think that now too it is the regime itself that has come to the decision to resolve the issue?
Zibakalam: Contrary to the principlist group, I do not believe that the fault rested completely with Ahmadinejad. I agree with him that in 2011 and 2012 he had lost all say in the nuclear issue and that it was the supreme national security council that handled the issue. But we must remember that prior to these years Mr. Ahmadinejad and the administrations called all the shots on the issue.
On the main point of your question, I think that the whole leadership of the Islamic republic has come to the conclusion that it need not continue to pay the costs of the nuclear crisis. And that perhaps this project can be moved forward with far less costs to it. This assessment is consistent with the views of this government.
Rooz: So when Ali Shamkhani, the head of national security council tells an Arab language television station that the nuclear issue can be resolved and Mohammad Ali Jaafari, the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards also says that when the nuclear talks come to fruition, are they not in fact welcoming the agreement before hand?
Zibakalam: Absolutely. What you just quoted from these two confirms what I just said that the regime in totality has agreed to resolve the issue and wants to do it. They want to make a breakthrough from this dead end. Perhaps some principlists thought a few years ago that the nuclear crisis would not become very serious and that we could easily bypass sanctions against us. But what happened in 2011 and 2012 showed that the concern that existed in the West that Iran may be really moving towards nuclear weapons is serious and that this was not just an excuse to punish Iran. Because of this, from about end of 2011 and 2012 the higher echelons of the principlist group began to realize that if Iran does not want to develop nuclear weapons then why should it pay the costs of such fears.
Rooz: Some political analysts still believe that Wests’ concerns about a nuclear Iran are excuses for getting concessions from Iran in other areas.
Zibakalam: There are some in Iran who think that we should possess a number of small nuclear weapons. Some of my colleagues at the political science department at Tehran University have such views and I jokingly call them the “father of Iran’s nuclear bomb.” They seriously believe that we should have a few such bombs so that the notion of militarily attacking Iran will disappear forever. There are even some intellectuals, writers and Guard commanders who think like this. But at the same there are also people in the same strata who reject such views. Then there is the third group that believes that the West knows that we are not interested in pursuing nuclear weapons, something that the IAEA also shows, but that this is a notion that is put forward to pressure Iran to stop its support for Hamas and the Palestinian resistance, or about the policies in Iraq and support for the Shiites, Bashar Assad, etc.
But what is important and clear is that Rouhani’s administration is determined to honorably close the nuclear dossier.
Rooz: When and if it ends, what impact will this have on the economic and political situation in Iran? For example on the pro-democracy movement?
Zibakalam: I believe that going beyond the nuclear knot not only will remove the greatest obstacle to development and progress and will open up Iran’s economy in the next four or five years, but it will also open up the political atmosphere and result in an improvement in the human rights situation. Some may say that these issues are not related. But the answer is that if Iran can reach an understanding with the US and Europe over the nuclear issue, it is possible that it will also cooperate more with the Americans in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. When relations with the West get better, Iran will no longer be able to say that it wants to behave anyway it desires in the realm of human rights and that this is of no concern to the West.
Zibakalam stressed at the end of the interview that when a resolution over the nuclear issue is achieved, it will also result in greater respect for human rights. Today, there is no such pressure because there are no relations with the US and so we can the Canadians or anybody can pass any resolution they want against Iran. But when the minimum of relations are established there will be some requirements to maintain and expand them.